KiwiSlaver.
Mr Cullen is not supporting his baby, and will revenue minister Peter Dunne be collecting child support from this delinquent deadbeat who is having a multi million dollar overseas fling at the expense of New Zealand Child Support Payers.
Many Fathers simply have no choice, their child support is deducted from their pay at source and delivered to the consolidated fund, and while that is the case they also have ever right to grumble at the finance ministers behaviour.
Fathers that have no choice but to pay tax and child support have every right to expect that this money will be delivered to the benefit of their children and that the Revenue Minister and the Finance minister will act in the interests of their children.
We hear the calls from Mr Cullen telling the man in the street to save in KiwiSaver, and the Revenue Minister, to pay up and shut up or we will lock you up, while they are gambling Millions of our children’s dollars on the currency market.
New Zealand men are becoming slaves to an unconstitutional government that squanders their labour. Is this is what is called acting in the public interest.
No, acting in an unconstitutional way cannot possibly be seen or interpreted to be acting in the public interest.
The point to be proved is how this unconstitutional behaviour can be recognised by that interest. First the allegation needs to hold merit. Then it needs so to be tested. Thirdly it requires an expression of the interest adversly affected to be lifted into a forum that it will be puublished. Each of us who do not want to have our interest compromised (and in the global sense our sons and daughters) must take to some degree of exercise in these three principles if there is to be any possibility of success or return for such interest.
The examples or more accurately the expressions of that none constitutional as disaffecting regime are the first hurdle. We can talk about thier existance but that they exist must be proved. The proof exists.
Without exploring some of the more complicated issues it seems reasonable to me that we can look at a relatively simple situation. Everyone has the right to be treated a innocent before being proved guilty. This is not only a legal presumption it is enshrined in the NZ Bill of Rights. There is no legal document of counter claim to this statement, unless in case law that I have not yet (although the breach is heralded in presumption throughout my own case) read.
Ex- parte orders under the Domestic Violence Act including children compromises these conditions of enshrined rights. The justification for this act without legal documented support is in s.4 of the BORA as a justifiable limitation. The existance of s.4, however, does not interfere with the fact where a presumption exists – the allegations of violence stand first and the secondary condition is the act of a defence. Constitutionaly if we accept s.4 there is a permit to torture in NZ. That is to use the contact with one’s son or daughter as reason to demand a defence. If you do not defend you will not see your son or daughter, you will be guilty of the crime and your rights of association with your domestic relations will be revoked. You are guilty first. However, and again if to accept this barbaric condition one accepts that as a justifiable limitation it is important to protect the children from any potential of damage, but not to torture, access must be provided. This impliments the right of association over the presumption of guilt where the “respondent” still has access available even though under an application of the DVA it would be supervised. So we come to a place if considering the states behaviour as demonstrably justified by limitation supervised access is available to the respondent, even if they have been alleged as and convicted of guilt that they have not defended. This in my case is the circumstance.
What I have said above is that I am guilty of violence that has not necessarily been committed where I have chosen not to defend against the allegations. My son and daughter have been extracted from our association by relationship through the application of an order. If I want I can see them under supervised access because I am guilty of violence and am alleged to be a danger to them. Under this equation the children’s needs are paramount. Their safety is the first protection. Yet in the courts challenging this legal construction (or constitution) my ex under oath has said that there was no violence, in effect perjuring the original claim that I had used domestic violence against her or teh children. I hadn’t. Both from the allegations against me as well as the cross examination that was shut down by a criminal (I deliberately breached the order by sending a letter to Phil Goff and copying it to her) JUDGE there has been no violence.
Besides the court case which was an absolute sham, the fact remains that I am violent. What for noone knows. And in order for the state to protect itself from having compromised its constitution by the very last letter of these draconian laws: it must make supervised access available to provide for the association laws and removal from the act of torture. On one occassion as I complained to CYFS who ignored my request my former wife turned down my request to have supervised access. Why? Because I pissed her off. No other reason – just because I pissed her off. On the occassion next week that I have managed to organised to see my son and daughter under these supervised conditions, the State, as am I, are left with a problem. It is user pays. If I don’t have $30 up front there will be no contact.
That, if we are to protect the interests of the child as first and paramount is not constitutional either legally or ethically. This is only one example of many.
So where is the army to complain?
Respectfully,
Benjamin Easton
(of a) fathers’ coalition.
Comment by Benjamin Easton — Thu 14th June 2007 @ 1:54 pm
Benjamin,
I’m not very conversant with principles of law, so I’m asking a question: you seem to be suggesting that law should be coherent, ie that in order to obey one law, one shouldn’t be forced to breach another law.
Is this indeed what you’re saying, and if so, is there any legal requirement that law be coherent?
Comment by Rob Case — Thu 14th June 2007 @ 4:22 pm
Yes Rob,
but less from the subjective principle but as demanded from the objective.
This has been proved in my investigation and the thing that separates these facts from expansion is the publication by the media. This is to say that the freedom of expression is limited by the media.
To quantify my comment, a media group has recently been involved in an attempt to purchase the Dow Jones. What have the media got to do with such an investment if their purpose is the distribution of information? Clearly their purpose is not directed at the function of their industry. Their purpose for this example is to enhance the investment of their stake/share holders. Logically where these priorities have gone under the tamper, the reader misses out on any information that could jeopordise the stake or share holding.
Your question takes my collection of recent submissions many miles ahead of the developing trail for the readership and I am not ungrateful – this can get tiring. S.7 of the NZBORA is an instrument that was championed by I believe Sir Geoffrey Palmer in the Act’s draft and he has written about it as if it is a “roadblock”. This is the single instrument that qualifies your question. It is the base principle of law and makes it coherent. However, in our practice as arguably inherited (or as first established) from the English Laws Act 1856 it has been the presumption of parliament to utilise the principle as a prerogative of that any parliament. This is the controversy. You will note that the United Nations advocated recently that NZ should concretise the BORA, the Treaty of Waitangi, into our legislation along with MMP. Such an act would construct the provision of coherent law as you define but wouldn’t do so well on stabilising such a purpose where there are too many variables. These variables are formed one from the manifestation of our misdirected practices and two (in my opinion) where the constitution does not have a broad enough commonality under the principles of Te Tiriti in order to be effected with any substantial degree of national success. I digress again.
You advance my submissions because the justification for coherent law exists but because of our evolved practices it (where justified by s.7)it cannot be implimented. The judiciary, however, provided an answer by nearly consistent judgement and that was in order to preserve the legislature to muck around with how they want to organise law that s.7 (the licence to be legally incoherent) required adjudication in terms alone of manner and form and not content. Under the Care of Children Bill, however, Margaret Wilson, then AG and now Speaker stuffed up; very, very, very: Big time. So after that introduction, against how the judiciary had given themselves licence to adjudicate over any such presumption of law the issue of coherent legislation is unconstitutional. Which doesn’t answer your question. I more simply define the relevant problem.
Better to answer your question: The presumption and present application of legislation including over how it is to be adjudicated is no. Yet anything consistent with the Bill of Rights Shall be preferred.
Now we have a “yes” and a “no”. I say the answer both for the mistake as well as the intention is yes, you are led to believe no.
Comment by Benjamin Easton — Fri 15th June 2007 @ 10:48 am
Bevan,
What else would we expect from a venemous snake like Cullen?
And why would we ever expect Dunny-boy to be “Family Friendly”? Isn’t there a law somewhere about “fit for purpose”?
The Dunce’s changes to “detain at the border” resemble the free train tickets given to the Jews during Hitler’s reign in Germany.
Bring on th egreat darkness!
Comment by Ethos — Fri 15th June 2007 @ 12:43 pm
Conclusion
We have considered whether the Child Support Amendment Bill (No 4) is consistent with he Bill of Rights Act, and particularly whether the restriction on the ability of parties to obtain legal representation or the services of a professional advocate are consistent with the principles of natural justice.
We have come to the conclusion that the Bill does appear to be consistent with the Bill of Rights Act.
In accordance with previous practice, we attach a copy of this opinion for referral to the Minister of Justice. A copy is also attached for referral to the Minister of Revenue if you agree.
http://www.justice.govt.nz/bill-of-rights/bill-list-2005/c-bill/child-support-amend-bill-4.html
So much for BORA!
There have been a number of people (over the years) who have claimed that they have found the magic key in legislation and that there case is going to change the law……
They talk a lot and write long wordy documents that tell you that its a conspiracy and the judicary are corrupt etc.
Still waiting for quantification of the scucess these people are claiming.Why am I waiting, because none of them have ever delivered any change to the status quo.
Scrap
Comment by Scrap_The_CSA — Fri 15th June 2007 @ 1:09 pm
Benjamin,
Thanks for your answer, and for drawing my attention to Section 7 of the NZ Bill of Rights:
This doesn’t seem to me to be sufficient to ensure coherent law. “Bringing something to the attention of the House of Representatives” doesn’t compel them to do anything about it.
Whilst reading through the bill, I came upon Section 4:
If I read this correctly, this section specifically allows courts to make rulings that are inconsistent with the Bill of Rights.
Comment by Rob Case — Fri 15th June 2007 @ 1:36 pm
Yes that is correct.
Go back to my answer though where I recognise the limitation of s.7 (as) by the courts where the precedents in common law rule that such a report “could” interfere only supersede A.9 English Bill of Rights Act 1689 on an issue of manner and form and not on content. This article is the freedom of parliament to be free of scrutiny by the courts. S.4 covers this although it is trumped if an interpretation can be directly given under s.6 which is consistent with the BORA. If you have been following what I have written in other posts as relevant to the DVA or the CSA or CYFSA that s.4 gives the citizen a condition of preference if their case can be directly associated to the BORA. The measure is under s.5 of what is demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society and this is what I claim is the test. It is an unlawful discrimination under the HRA s.21 (l) (i) (ii) to remove child support on the basis that one no longer has care of ones children. Under s.4 the argument of the Minister has to be consistent with s.4 as it is the state’s only justifiable legislative limitation. Under the provisions of a case by case basis the individual can argue under s.9 that the actions of the unreasonable practice and especially cruel.
So if here I was to concur with the justification of s.4 in balanced probability over the protections instituted by the state it would be because the state had no history of involvement for any mistake in any kind of (s.9) cruel treatment. This is the point that the men’s movement should concentrate on compiling. Whats been occurring is draconian, brutal and continued to be administered without any great indication in remorse. I submit that the State has no defence. I could add more to this but will leave it for lack of time so to write but must add that I have already taken this argument in communication with the Minister of Justice beyond my point as presented here for the introduction of the Care of Children Bill. His first reply was to bat for the camp of s.4 and he lost that one to s.6 where s.7 is quite specific to the demand of s.6. The word used is SHALL. If s.7 is protected to the BORA it is because s.7 (as is natural justice) is bound to s.6. They trump s.4 and s,5 together. Mark Burton has replied recently with a further defence and the only line he has left available for any defence that the BORA is not supreme law.
So first he has to dismantle everything of value in the BORA and say to use it in accord with the executive is to “piss in the wind”. He’s wrong. It is our unique identity. Secondly he is wrong because of the oath that he and everyone else has taken in regard to their duty and honour. So I do not accept that this is not cohesive law. If you go back to my yes and no paragraph some of this may begin to make sense.
From here the point over and above everything else discussed is that there is only one other provision above the oath that could determine our necessity to observe the principles protected by the BORA and this is our duty to children. Go into this from the corrupted practice I have proved under s.7 by MW in 2003 and you will find a direct discrimination against children in order to allow a single woman or lesbian couple to have children without being dependent on the father and we again break our commitment to International convention.
Then: into the subjective, try this; women demanded equality because they wanted to remove the discrimination suffered by them for mens’ activities, and what was the reply? They then implimented a direct discrimination against children in order to get what they wanted which was “freedom”. Freedom from whom? Freedom from what?
Cheers,
Benjamin.
Comment by Benjamin Easton — Fri 15th June 2007 @ 3:03 pm
The amendment is not the Principal Bill. If you wanted the assessment on the original text it would only be available through the Official Informations Act. There was no report on the Bill in 91 as there was no report on the Domestic Violence Bill in 94. This is the point that identifies the original problem. This I would submit is why the information on such reports prior to 2000 is only accessible through the OIA. This is because there are very few reports. They started to become the fashion after 2003. In my prior post you might read which is interesting to the report that was compiled under the Amendment that natural justice itself is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights because the Bill of Rights is not supreme law. However, there is an even more startling point than this which to me is immediately alarming and proves at this point by allegation that the consistency in the Crown Law needs deeper scrutiny. The amendment includes a notation on the age of a person. At the age of 16 a child is protected to be discriminated against. This excuses the authority for the presented argument from including the ststus of “child” as requiring any notation by way of report. The reason this is alarming is bewcause this is the basis of principle demanding a report on the Care of Children Bill where under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child a child for international consensus requires such discrimination as protection up until the age of 18. This inconsistency as identified by the Care of Children Bill is also applicable to the Domestic Violence Act where the age determined is 17. As the report rightfully points out the discrimination in age is all over the place in legislation and its inconsistency, so far as the Amendment report concludes has no more been addressed as it should have at least been recognised. So the “we don’t care” attitude is quite profound.
Comment by Benjamin Easton — Fri 15th June 2007 @ 3:50 pm
So where is the success? Quantified and objective.The legal decision that clearly states what is claimed. You can argue bule is white, its the outcome that matters.
Rob is right – Parliament is not required to Act and Judges can ignore it as they see fit.
Rob you might like to check out :
http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reports/2004/bill-of-rights-guidelines/part1.html
Scrap
Comment by Scrap_The_CSA — Fri 15th June 2007 @ 4:03 pm
I haven’t yet published Mark Burton’s latest reply although have covered in brief thae substantive element of the BORA’s jurisdiction, here and in other forums. Additionally as I said before there is one complaint, probably to expand to two sitting before the Office of the Ombudsmen and it incorporates the basic principle of the CSA. This status is still conditional to some events that are still inconclusive yet for the record of this public, the governing direction I promote to the challenge is that it is a challenge on the independence of bureaucratic measures to calculate the demonstrable justification as supportive in the poublic interest as against supportive of the bureaucracy. So in direct reply, the information you ask for isn’t quite ready. The reason for broadcasting in this way as presumptive is because the Ministry of Social Development had first option on weighing the facts. For whatever reason they have declined this opportunity. My task then: where the logical necessity if my argument alleges to protect the public and general interest and its detractors reject such an application of allegations against them by further oppressing that interest, is to raise the crowd. And that is what this is about. I welcome the test to what I put forward in this forum because if I am wrong, then I am wrong. I could then apologise. Rob’s observation is still a fair distance away from drawing me to such a test and apology, as is I promote, Mark Burtons.
Comment by Benjamin Easton — Fri 15th June 2007 @ 4:31 pm